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Courts of last resort now seldom reverse a ruling on the com-
petency of witnesses.' Convinced, and rightly so, that they can-
not learn from the record all the circumstances which influenced
the decision below, they usually let it stand, even when the tran-
script alone might suggest another conclusion. Trial courts, in
their turn, to a greater extent than formerly prefer to admit the
evidence of infants, insane people, and mental defectives, and
leave the jury to estimate its value. Perhaps this is because
exclusion has heretofore worked particular hardship in prosecut-
ions for crimes against children and the insane, where the only
evidence available was that of the victim.2 Now these aggrieved
individuals may testify even when the gist of the action, as in
statutory rape,3 or the title of the action, as where a "lunatic"
sues by his next friend,4 indicates their infirmity. The infirmity
alone does not render them incompetent.
In all jurisdictions witnesses must show that they possess
* This series grew out of a paper read before the Council on Remedies,
Association of American Law Schools, in December, 1926, which was
followed by an article on the general subject printed in July, 1927.
Hutchins, The Law and the Psyclwlogists (1927) 16 YALE REV. 678. The
series is the joint work of Mortimer J. Adler and Jerome Michael of Colum-
bia University, and Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger of Yale
University. This paper was prepared by the Yale authors with the advice
and approval of the Columbia authors. Other papers in the series have
appeared in (1928) 28 COL. L. R. 432 and(1928) 41 HAIv. L. REv. 860.
The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to A. J. Russell, an Honors
student in Evidence at Yale. The present paper is confined to the compet-
ency of infants, mental defectives, and insane persons.
IWIGTORE, EvmENC (2d ed. 1923) c. 19, 20.
2 Reg. v. Hill, 5 Cox. C. C. 259 (1851).
3 Beard v. State, 256 Pac. 354 (Ark. 1927); State v. Crouch, 130 Iowa
478, 107 N. W. 173 (1906). See also L. R. A. 1916 F 749, annotation and
9 Ann. Cas. 1218 (1906) annotation.
-Worthington v. Mercer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892).
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intelligence enough to observe what went on, recollect it, and
tell a comprehensible story., In a few no additional require-
ments must be met.6 In others the witness must appear able
to tell right froif wrong, truth from falsehood, and to appreciate
the duty to tell the truth on the stand.7 In most courts, however,
that is not enough. The witness must understand the nature
and obligation of the oath., It will not suffice that he knows
enough to testify; he must understand that divine punishment
will follow false swearing.9 These are apparently the only items
the trial court need consider. If these requirements are satis-
fied, the witness will not be incompetent because he was hysteri-
cal at the time of the event, 0 or an insane epileptic at time of
the trial.",
These rules, even the mildest of them, look rigid enough on
paper. In practice they acquire a good deal of flexibility because
of the discretion which the trial judge has in their administra-
tion. In Bell v. State,12 for instance, a nine year old boy told
the court that he did not know what an oath was, that he had
never heard of God or the devil, and that he had never heard
of the truth before. Affirming the ruling below that the witness
was competent, the Supreme Court of Georgia said: 1
"Children who do not understand the nature of an oath are
incompetent witnesses; but it is left to the sound discretion of
the trial judge to determine whether a boy 9 years of age is a
competent witness; and where the court examines a boy of that
age as to his understanding of the nature of an bath, and decides
that he is competent to testify, this court will not grant a new
trial where it does not appear that the discretion of the court
has been manifestly abused, which does not appear in this case."
5 WIGmox, op. cit. supra note 2, § 5091; Lanier v. Bryan, 184 N. C. 235,
114 S. E. 6, 26 A. L. R. 1491 (1923) annotation; White v. Corn, 96 Ky.
180, 28 S. W. 340 (1894).
6 State v. Prokosch, 152 Minn. 86, 187 N. W. 971 (1922); Mead v.
Harris, 101 Mich. 585, 60 N. W. 284 (1894); see (1927) 36 YA LAw
JOURNAL 423.
7 Goy v, Director General of Railroads, 79 N. H. 512, 111 Atl. 855 (1920),
noted in (1921) 7 VA. L. REv. 663. And compare the statement in State
v. Meyer, 135 Iowa 507, 508, 113 N. W. 322, 323: "If, without being familiar
with the use of such words, she had an adequate sense of the impropriety
of falsehood, she understood the nature of an oath, even though not able
to state what those words meant."8 Jimenez v. State, 280 S. W. 829 (Tex. Cr. App. 1926); Ruocco v.
Logiocco, 104 Conn. 585, 134 Atl. 73 (1926); 37 L. R. A. 423 (1897)
annotation.
9 See State v. Abercrombie, 130 S. C. 358, 126 S. E. 142 (1925).
10 State v. Pryor, 74 Wash. 121, 132 Pac. 874, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1028
(1913) annotation.
11 People v. Enright, 256 Ill. 221, 99 N. E. 936, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 318,
annotation.
12 164 Ga. 292, 138 S. E. 238 (1927).
13 Ibid. 295, 138 S. E. at 240.
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As might be expected, most of the reversals on questions of
competency occur in jurisdictions requiring an understanding
of the oath. Even mature and intelligent laymen might be some-
what put to it to give a definition that would strike the fancy of
every court. On what basis, for example, does an Episcopal
judge assess the definition given by a deist, an atheist, or a
Primitive Baptist? The more deeply one has thought about the
nature and obligation of the oath, or even the difference between
right and wrong, the more difficult one will find it to give a
straightforward response to the questions upon which the com-
petency of infants, mental defectives, and insane people now gen-
erally depends. In view of this difficulty, the judge may resort
to one of three methods of determining whether the witness com-
plies with the requirement of understanding the oath. He may
content himself with a purely formal question, "Do you under-
standthenature of an oath?" and the purely formal reply, "Yes."
Or he may assume, as he apparently did in Bell v. State, that any
person of reasonable intelligence is able to appreciate the moral
problem, thus in effect abolishing the rule. Or he may make an
earnest effort to discover whether the witness really under-
stands what an oath is and what it means. In this case the
judge will simply be measuring the witness's religious and moral
standards against his own. Religious and moral standards in
this country are at present in such dispute that this method
greatly reduces the usefulness of the rule in practice.
The trial judge, then, is on the issue of competency clothed
with great, and for America, unusual powers. He it is who
determines whether a person has sufficient conscience and intelli-
gence to tell a story to the jury which will not be so foolish
or so false as to require exclusion in advance. The methods he
may employ in reaching his conclusion are also in his discretion.
If the rules of his jurisdiction compel him to find that the witness
understands the nature and obligation of an oath, he may resort
to any one of the three methods described above, or to a combina-
tion of them. If intelligence alone is the criterion he may
apparently rule that a proffered witness is incompetent from
inspection alone.14 Usually, of course, he will conduct some sort
of examination, either with or without the advice of experts.
Thus, in Commonwealth v. Tatisos,5 the following questions
were put to a six year old child:
"What is your name? Mlabel Stafford.
How old are you? Six ......
Do you go to Sunday School? No.
To church? Yes ......
24 State v. Martin, 132 At. 93 (N. J. 1926).
25 238 Mass. 322, 130 N. E. 495 (1921).
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Do you know what happens to anybody when they tell a lie?
Yes .... Lick them.
Who does the licking. The mother.....
Anything else happen to them? Whipping.
Do you know why you are here today? No.
Do you know what an oath is? Mouth? . . . . . .
Ever hear about that [the catechism]? Yes.
What is it? Do you know any of it? No.
Did you ever hear of God? No ........
The trial judge thought the child intelligent but uninstructed,
and suspended the case till the next day in order that she might
converse with a priest. The next morning the questions began
again: 16
"Did the priest talk to you last night? Some ......
Do you know what happens to little girls when they tell lies?
God punishes them.
Who? God."
The defense attorney then added some questions of his own:
"Who is God? God is a creator.
Do you know what you came down here to court for?
No, sir ......
You don't know what an oath is? I don't know what that is.
How does God punish anybody? Sends them down to the
ground .....
Where is God? God is up in heaven ...... "
The judge thereupon decided that the child could testify.
Jenny, J., in overruling exceptions said: "
"The child was examined twice on different days, in the absence
of the jury, and instructed by a priest in the interval. After
most careful consideration, she was permitted to testify." (Italics
are the writers').
In a seduction case,' 8 the daughter of the plaintiff, at the time
an inmate of an institution for defectives, was permitted to take
the stand after having told the court that she had never heard
of a supreme being; that she did not know what God meant;
that she had no idea what happened when you lied, except that
you would get into trouble; and that she was ignorant of the obli-
gation of the oath. But she knew what the oath was because "I
see it with my eyes in the court when I went to the court and they
testified." An expert then declared that although not mentally
deranged, the girl was defective in judgment and comprehension.
The trial judge permitted her to be sworn, saying, "I think she
16 Ibid. 323, 130 N. E. at 496.
"Ibid. 326, 130 N. E. at 498.
is Ruocco v. Logiocco, supra note 8.
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knows enough to testify." But the Supreme Court of Errors
felt compelled to reverse his judgment, in spite of the admittedly
great difficulty of diagnosing mental ability from a record.
A study of some of the other infrequent cases where the trial
judge's ruling on competency is reversed shows that this usually
occurs because of a difference of opinion as to the type of ques-
tions asked, or as to the value of the answers given. In People
v. Delaney,", "In reply to the court's questions, the boy gave his
name and age, stated that he had been in court before...., that
he attended Sunday School; that he lived with his mother, who,
he said, had taught him to tell the truth, and that he thought
that boys who do not tell the truth would be put in jail." On
appeal it was held that this investigation was insufficient,
because "there is nothing in the trial court's examination that
tends to disclose the strength or weakness of the child's power of
recollection." In Carter v. State,-20 a nine year old girl "answered,
that she did not know what the Bible was; had never been to
church but once, and that was to her mother's funeral; did not
know what book it was she laid her hand on when sworn; had
heard tell of God, but did not know who it was; and said if
she swore to a lie, she would be put in jail but did not know she
would be punished in any other way." The court held the ex-
amination inadequate. In State v. Jackson,2 decided in Febru-
ary, the Supreme Court of Missouri thought the child's answers
indicated "appalling ignorance" although the trial judge had
permitted her to testify. The court saw this ignorance in the
fact that she thought the prosecuting attorney was "trying to
clear Papa," when he was trying to do just the opposite. She
did not know what an oath was, though she had taken one a
moment ago.
The cases cited raise several problems. One of them is: does
the oath have a predictable effect on testimony? Here we have
only the result of a few experiments - that when statements are
made under oath the number of items recalled is smaller but the
objective accuracy is greater than without the oath. Even as-
suming these to be conclusive they lead to a further inquiry as to
the intelligence of the subjects of the experiment. Until we know
more about that we cannot tell what the oath is worth or how
much intelligence is required to understand its nature and
obligation. Another problem raised by the rules on competency
is that of the accurate diagnosis of mental ability.23  At the
19 52 Cal. App. 765, 199 Pac. 896 (1921).
2063 Ala. 52 (1879).
212 S. W. (2d) 758 (Mo. 1928).
22 POFFENBERGER, APPLIn PSYCHOLOGY (1927) c. 24; WHIPPLE, MANUAL OP
MENTAL AND PHYsIcAL TESTS (1915) c. 8. Most of the experiments cited
use the oath as a test of certainty.
If psychology can help solve this problem it will also help the courts
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present time mental ability is diagnosed by the trial judge in the
ways that have been indicated. It remains to be seen whether
psychology can give him any assistance.
Dr. Alfred Binet 24 when he began the test movement that has
contributed so much to American psychology was less concerned
with competency than with the commitment of the feeble-minded
to institutions. Before Binet's work the routine process of com-
mitment in France was to have a few questions asked by an
expert or a judge and a speculative decision rendered as to the
mental ability of the person before the tribunal. Binet sought an
objective uniform standard, so little dependent upon the idiosyn-
crasies of an individual examiner that a decision might be as ac-
curately checked from a transcript of the proceedings as is a
column of figures by an adding machine. In order to understand
the efficacy of his tests it is desirable first to clear up some ques-
tions of methodology.
Courts and psychologists 25 speak of the "intelligence" they are
attempting to measure as though it were an objective reality like
a hat, or a coat, or a number. To test "intelligence" psycholo-
gists ask a child to repeat eight digits backwards, or tap cubes
in a certain order .2  Then, when they argue that they are
testing objective reality, the simple refutation seems to be that
it does not take intelligence to answer such questions. Or the
judge tells the psychologist, as recently happened in a New York
court, 27 that the questions of the court are better than the ques-
to ascertain whether a person has the capacity to understand the obligation
of an oath.
24 Binet et Simon, Le Developpement de I'hntelligence chez les Enfants
(1908) 14 ANNEE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 1.
25See, for instance, such excellent discussions as THURSTONE, TiEl
NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE (1926), 156 et seq., and GATES, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
STUDENTS OF EDUCATION (1923) 421 et seq.
26Repeating digits is part of the Stanford Revision of Binet, fully
described in TERMAN, THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE (1916) 121.
Tapping cubes, the Knox cube test, is described in GATES, op. cit. supra
note 25, at 425.
27New York Times, Mar. 30, 1928, at 2: "One man, alleged to have been
a victim of delirium tremens, committed on complaint of his wife, was
questioned closely by the Court and answered all the questions intelligently.
"This man should be given a chance to get away from drink in his private
life and he would be all right. He isn't crazy," said Justice Cropsey.
"He has no insight into his condition," said Dr. H. B. Blau, who was in
charge of the patients. "Suppose he should harm some one after he is re-
leased?"
. "That would be a mistake," the Justice remarked, "but doctors make
.mistakes, too. If it is a mark of insanity not to have insight into your
own condition, then half the people in the world must be insane. I am
not .going to send people away on the mere say-so of any doctor."
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tions of the Stanford-Binet because common sense tells us that
they have a more direct bearing on intelligence. It seems closer
to reality to ask a person what happens to liars than to get at
the same result by suggesting that he fit blocks into a form, or
copy diamonds in ink.28
But "intelligence" is not an objective entity; it is a logical
fiction. It is a formula expressing the relation of one set of
facts to another.2' People who behave in certain ways are
called intelligent, or, to avoid confusion, X. Behaving in certain
ways means that they live up to a general average. They earn
their own living, support their dependents, obey the laws of
their jurisdiction, read the newspapers, and live according to
the mores of their group. In spite of strildng individual differ-
ences which they display, we may assume as a working basis that
these X persons can get along in society, and in that part of
society which is called a court. People who vary from this norm,
who are subnormal or supernormal, have to be watched and
specially studied. Their activities are less predictable. In that
sense they are not as reliable either in court or out as the X
group. The child who saw the oath every time she came to
court was held to be a poor witness. The genius who wrote
"The Importance of Being Earnest" was equally unsatisfactory,
though much more diverting on the stand. Both fell outside
the general average. An intelligent person, then, as the psychol-
ogists use the term, is not necessarily an intellectual person. He
is an inconspicuous person, a member of the great middle group.
Inspection alone, or inspection plus casual unstandardized
"But this case was examined by Dr. William H. Blake and Dr. Hiram
Elliott," said Dr. Blau.
"Yes, I see," was the Court's terse comment. "Their names are on a lot
of papers certifying as insane a number of people I have released, but it
doesn't mean so much-this funny stuff thwy write on these papcra-and
I am going to give this man a chance."
The patient's wife interrupted.
"How about support, Judge?" she asked. "He hasn't supported me."
Statements in the commitment papers showed the woman had not asked
for financial aid during the period her husband was confined. After read-
ing this Justice Cropsey said:
"Perhaps he's right in the things he said about you. Perhaps he's not
as crazy as you think he is," and he ordered the man released under con-
dition that he make periodic reports to the Court.'
2s Fitting blocks is used in various tests, such as the Healy A and the
Goddard form board. It is useful as a measure of native ability where
language presents a problem. Copying a diamond is one of the seven year
tests of the Stanford Binet.
29 Logical fictions or hypotheses are discussed in VMUHuN;En, Tuc
PHILOSOPHY OF As-IF (1927); BARRY, SCIENTIFIC HAITr OF THOUGLT
(1927) ; LEwis, THE ANATOMY OF ScmNc (1926). A simple untechnical




questions, may enable us to detect some of those who fall far
outside the general average, like the driveling idiot. 0 But where
the mental infirmity is not accompanied by some physical infirm.
ity or by obvious incoherence in reply, we need rigidly to exclude
the subjective element 31 if we would avoid letting a pleasant
looking defective get by where an ugly just-normal person would
not. Without the aid of science we must rely on intuitive judg-
ments alone.
We shall accept the aid of science with a clear conscience if we
recall at every step that "intelligence" is a logical fiction, a
formula, and that we are concerned here only with the relation-
ship of one set of known events to another, which the formula
describes. The problem is not the measurement of "intelli-
gence," but the correlation of these two sets of events. Given
one, the presence or abtence of the other may within limits be
predicted, not infallibly, but with a high percentage of prob-
ability. There need be no apparent logical relationship between
the two sets of events. They may seem ridiculously incom-
patible. But we shall have attained our object if, for example,
we discover in ten thousand cases a correlation of .75 between
the antepenult of the middle name of one's fourth cousin and
membership in Phi Beta Kappa.3 2 However absurd such a con-
nection may seem, it gives us in this case an objective method
of measuring what is termed intelligence.
With this attitude toward the measurement of intelligence,
Binet and his followersZ3 gradually worked out a series of
graded questions which by actual test correlated with the average
ability of children of certain ages.3 4 This led to the establish-
ment of mental age standards. One of the best known of these
30 WATSON, BEHAVIORISM (1925) 232.
31 The most difficult subnormal to detect is the so-called verbal defective.
Long words and a ready flow of language get him into all sorts of situations
that he cannot cope with. Even a trained psychologist finds it hard to
identify this type by inspection alone. HEALY, INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT
(1915) 273.
32 These correlations, which at first sight appear ridiculous, occur in other
fields of science. In medicine, for example, it must have at first seemed
rather silly to believe that a reddening and scar following vaccination
correlated with immunity from smallpox. That has become a commonplace
now, but when it was a theory it was viewed with as much suspicion as
are psychological tests today.
33 It would take many pages to enumerate the followers of Binet. Ter-
man, Goddard, Yerkes, and Bridges are some who have modified the origi-
nal Binet-Simon tests. Healy, Bronner, Knox, Pintner, Patterson, Gates,
Thorndike, Thurstone, Haggerty, Whipple, Woodworth, Gesell, Wells,
Downey, Otis, etc.,-almost every psychologist today has at least one
standardized test of some trait or quality to his credit. They are not all
of equal merit, however, and any one should be carefully scrutinized before
being used.
34 The method of standardization was as follows: innumerable tests
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tests, the Stanford Revision of Binet, has from four to six
questions in each age group and can be administered in less than
twenty minutes. If greater speed is necessary the starred 35
questions only can be given in half the time, and the measure is
still accurate enough for practical purposes. Thus in less than
ten minutes it is possible to make a test of intelligence which is
wholly objective and which can be checked from the record alone
by anybody who is familiar with the method.
These advantages have in the past ten years induced people
who are constantly confronted, as the courts are, with the prob-
lem of determining quickly and with a fair degree of accuracy
competency for different positions to resort to psychological
tests.36 School systems all over the United States use tests to
distribute children according to ability, with a resultant decrease
in repeated grades and maladjustment. Universities are follow-
ing their lead; recently the College Entrance Board adopted a
psychological test as part of its requirements. Even the law
schools are becoming interested. One of the leading schools
in the East has just announced that it will base its system of
entrance henceforth partly on a "capacity test." During the war
the army by this method chose men for various posts with signal
success.3 7 Industry is now making use of this time and labor
saving device. 38 A large department store has found that
through it their labor turnover has been greatly decreased. The
experience of these widely varied interests, all of whom have
were given to children ranging in age from four to eighteen. The situa-
tions were such as asking name, age, number of fingers on each hand,
making rhymes, copying figures, tapping cubes, repeating a series of num-
bers forward and backward, etc. To determine the eight year norm, for
example, some fifteen hundred eight year old solutions were analyzed. Any
question that no eight year old child answered was obviously too di-icult.
Any question answered correctly by all the eight year olds and most of
the sevens was obviously too easy. But a problem solved by about three
quarters of the eights, practically all of the nines, and hardly any of the
sevens was apparently an appropriate test for a normal eight year old
child. After this process had been completed there remained a larger
number of questions than could be readily used for each age group. These
tests were then intercorrelated. If all the children solving A also solved B,
clearly one of the tests, preferably the one that took the most time, could be
eliminated. The tests retained were those which had the lowest intercor-
relation and, therefore, most certainly did not duplicate each other or
measure the same trait.
35 The starred tests on the Stanford-Binet constitute an abbreviated test.
In actual practice they are found to be slightly less reliable than the
whole test.
3 Again the only attempt is to devise a test on the basis of which the
future ability of individuals may be predicted.
-FREENAN, MENTAL TESTS (1926); YERKES (editor), PSYCHOLOGICAL
ExnuuNrXG IN THE U. S. ARmY (1921).
38 R. H. Macy & Co. of New York and the Yellow Cab Co. of Chicago
are two important examples of this tendency.
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an eye to speedy results, seems to show that the tests are practi-
cable as well as reliable.
Although the intelligence tests were not designed to reveal
mental aberrations, their use in practice has indicated that a
certain distribution 6f right and wrong answers is correlated
with mental unbalance.39 The normal ten year old child answers
correctly all the questions up to and including the ten year group.
If, on the other hand, the distribution of his answers is scattered
over all the age groups, with failures all the way down to four
years, and successes all the way up to sixteen, the performance
would be sufficiently suspicious to warrant turning the prospec-
tive witness over to a psychiatrist. In the absence of a court
psychiatrist one may at least distrust the testimony of a witness
whose performance on an intelligence test is scattered.
Since this form of examination has been employed with suc-
cess by countless organizations which have to settle the question
of competency much as the courts have to settle it, and since it
can be used with all the types of witnesses about whom the
question of competency is raised, it would seem that the courts
might use it with equal success. As a matter of fact, the kinds
of questions asked by courts and psychologists are not strikingly
dissimilar. Here in parallel columns are the examination of the
judge in Horton v. State 40 and of the psychologist in one of the
best known intelligence tests: 41
"How old are you? "What is the date?
How many days in the week? Name the months of the year.
What day of the week is it? Make change.
How many days in the month? Repeat these numbers back-
What year is it? ward: 6-5-2-8.
Has anybody talked to you Use these three words in a
about this case? sentence: boy, river, ball.
Would you be punished for tell- Give me some rhymes for day,
ing a lie?" mill, spring."
This comparison indicates that there are no shocking discrep-
ancies between the investigation conducted by the court and the
investigation conducted by the psychologist. Obviously the
psychologist has one advantage. His test could have been admin-
istered in ten or at most twenty minutes. The judicial inquiry
in Commonwealth 'v. Tatisos42 took part of two days. And in
almost all cases where competency is important, it will be found
that the psychological test has this advantage. But the advan-
3 9 TERMAN, op. cit. supa note 26, at 134; WELLS, MENTAL TESTS IN
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1927) 60. A more comprehensive study is necessary
in order to determine what is the "cause" of the special ability or disability.
40 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S. E. 647 (1926),.
47 The nine year test, Stanford-Binet.
4 2Supra note 15.
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tage of speed is not the only one. There is also the advantage of
certainty. Thus, in People v. Delawy, 3 after an extended ex-
amination by the trial court, the California Court of Appeal,
because it had a different standard from that of the court below,
felt compelled to reverse his judgment. In Ruocco v. Logiocco,"
in Carter v. State,45 in Horton v. State,0 and in State ?-. Jack-
son 4 7 the same difference of standard produced the same regret-
table result. The trial judge from his private background
decides that the witness is competent or incompetent. Then the
appellate court from its private background must pass on the
question, and has only a record to guide it. This leads to
uncertainty; and uncertainty in turn leads to delay, expense, and
miscarriages of justice. We find therefore that under the
present rules, the trial judge often needlessly consumes time at
the trial, the litigants needlessly consume time and money in
appealing, and the appellate courts needlessly consume time in
reversing and remanding, after writing protracted opinions
about vague abstractions to justify their action.
All these difficulties would be eliminated by the use of psycho-
logical tests to determine competency. These are valuable not
because the questions asked are more relevant (which they are
not), but because the replies are standardized into measurable
units. The time required is less than that expended on the con-
ventional judicial examination, and the results are clearly more
accurate. They can be used in all situations where competency
is involved. The present methods of ascertaining ability to
testify can only be sustained on the assumption that there must
be a logical relation between the subject of the investigation and
the questions asked. Science, however, demands not a logical
relation, but only a psychological correlation 8
43 Supra note 19.
44 Supra note 8.
4 Supra note 20.
46 Supra note 40.
47 Supra note 21.
-9Standardized intelligence tests of proved effectiveness in other fields
are probably better for the courtroom than the casual unstandardized
questions now used by trial judges to determine competency. But "we
should always remember that when we measure a child we measure only
what we measure and should not make inferences concerning what we have
not measured. Until we know much more than we do about the inter-
relationships of human functions we should measure ceach function scpar-
ately." Pyle, The I. Q. and the Individual (1927) 26 SCHOOL AND SOCIELY
788. It does not necessarily follow that a test which has been employed
successfully to predict ability to do grammar school work will predict
ability to testify equally well. Tests predicting ability to cope with the
courtroom situation must be developed in the courtroom situation in order
to get the maxmum of usefulness from them. Until this is done, however,
courts may employ standardized intelligence tests with a fair degree of con-
fidence.
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For recent cases in which questions relating to psychological tests
have been raised, see State v. Schlaps, 254 Pac. 858 (Mont. 1927) ; Strand
v. State, 252 Pac. 1030 (Wyo. 1927); and Clark v. State, 156 N. E. 219
(Ohio App. 1926). In the last, expert opinion as to the normality of the
accused based on three tests was held proper.
Cf. Chaffee, The Progress of the Law (1922) 35 11AMWV. L. Ruv. 302, 309:
"Although the law has refused to admit lay evidence that a witnes's
mentality is low, except when it approaches insanity, the report of a Binet-
Simon or other intelligence test would be of distinct value to a trained
judge in weighing testimony, and attempts to introduce such reports have
recently been made. Undoubtedly the wide use of such tests in the army
will have its influence."
Whether the cases indicate that a turning point has been reached cannot
be definitely stated for some time yet. But certainly enlightened opinion
is leading the way. Recently the National Crime Commission suggested
that the sanity or insanity of the accused be settled before trial so as not
to make that a major issue. Once the agency is created for the solution
9f the problem in criminal cases it will be simple to use it for the deter-
mination of competency, also before trial.
